Abstract
We investigate how the shift in stakeholder orientation affects bank financial reporting quality. Using the state-level enactment of constituency statutes as an exogenous variation in stakeholder orientation, and a sample of US commercial banks over the period 1980-2010, we find that the discretionary loan loss provisions decline for the banks expanding fiduciary duties to integrate stakeholder interest into corporate purpose. Our results are maintained against a battery of robustness checks for the quasi-experimental design. Banks with greater managerial discretion towards stakeholders also reduce alternative earnings management indicators, report small positive earnings changes less frequently, recognise loan losses timelier, record lower discretionary gains from available-for-sale securities and operate with a lower level of opaque assets. Further analyses show that banks with enhanced stakeholderist approach prioritise internal stakeholders which interact with reporting policies including employees and depositors, while external stakeholders such as bank regulators and supervisors are not influential in the corresponding change in reporting quality.