Abstract
Research on organizational adaptation and change, and on organizational politics, have developed largely as independent research streams, despite both being foundational to the intellectual legacy of the Carnegie School. Yet, power dynamics and internal coalitional politics often act as crucial barriers or drivers to change. From a political-interest perspective, the dominant coalition within a firm typically advances strategies that preserve the status quo and, hence, its influence, while peripheral, non-dominant coalitions tend to align themsevels with these strategic choices. However, political dynamics may shift the power balance, enabling the dominant coalition to push forward an agenda of change, or even pave the way for the formation of a new dominant coalition, with difference preferences and priorities. To proe deeper into these dynamics, we develop theory on how coalitions of executives are formed and reformed at the strategic apex of firms, motivated by the pursuit of their political interests, and propose a novel methodology for identifying coalitions and capturing their structural features. We empirically test our theory and arguments and our findings suggest that coalitional dynamics can be key drivers of strategic change, particularly under harsh conditions - such as performance shortfalls and environmental jolts. In a nutshell, our paper advocates for bringing coalitions and political dynamics back to the epicenter of organizational analysis, prompting further inquiry into the inner workings of organizations and organizational-level phenomena.