Abstract
The stability of corporate control is critical to a firm’s long-term sustainable development. In the context of fully tradable shares, heightened competition for control has prompted a growing number of listed firms to adopt anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) as a means of safeguarding control rights and ensuring organizational stability. While such provisions help mitigate the threat of takeovers, their implications for a firm’s commitment to stakeholders remain unclear. Drawing on manually collected data on charter-based ATPs among Chinese listed companies, this study examines the impact of these ATPs on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our results reveal that ATPs positively influence CSR engagement by promoting leadership stability. This positive effect of ATPs is stronger when CEO control is weaker, and when the risk of takeover is higher. Conversely, the effect diminishes in firms led by highly capable managers, suggesting a substitutive relationship between managerial ability and ATPs in fostering CSR. Further analyses reveal that ATPs improve firms’ responsibility toward employees, suppliers, customers, and the environment. The enhanced stakeholder orientation, in turn, contributes to higher firm value. Our study highlights the broader governance implications of anti-takeover mechanisms and their potential role in strengthening stakeholder-focused corporate governance.