Abstract
Innovation commons represent voluntary spaces driven by communities where individuals aggregate knowledge and resources to collectively develop and advance emerging technologies. Although these communities are essential for innovation at stages prior to market entry, premature quitting, defined as the intentional cessation or significant reduction of active participation before the natural conclusion of the collaborative life cycle, constitutes a persistent threat to their sustainability. This research examines how two governance mechanisms, namely entry and access alongside contribution and reward, mitigate premature quitting by cultivating effective feedback exchange. Additionally, the study investigates how perceived coordination difficulty, specifically disagreement induced by diversity, moderates this process. Utilizing a mixed method design involving semi-structured interviews with three community leaders and a survey of 360 participants across innovation commons in Vietnam, the results indicate that both governance initiatives significantly strengthen feedback mechanism, which subsequently reduces premature quitting. However, this protective effect weakens and may even reverse when perceived coordination difficulty is high. These findings extend Ostrom’s principles of commons governance, self-determination theory, and exit voice loyalty theory into the understudied domain of voluntary innovation communities within emerging economies.