Abstract
We analyse adulteration by milk farmers in two prevalent supply chain models in India. In the for-profit (FP) model, farmers are suppliers to a dairy company while in the profit-sharing (PS) model, the dairy is a cooperative that procures milk from the member farmers and shares profit with them. The aggregator can restrict adulteration in the FP model by adopting a strict testing policy. In contrast, the farmers resort to less adulteration in the PS model owing to their shared ownership. We find that the higher market price fetched by the aggregator because of its bargaining power owing to the consolidation of milk supplies, is essential for its operation. However, the higher testing cost (transaction cost) is a major impediment to the aggregator operation in the FP (PS) model. We also find that the FP (PS) model is more efficient in limiting adulteration when the testing cost is low (high).