Abstract
This paper analyses the opportunistic and routine insider trading at all US companies during the trade war of 2018. The baseline results indicate the positive relation between opportunistic insiders and holding period returns during the trade war. These relations are the same for opportunistic trades instead of insiders during the same period. In addition, the insider’s political connection indicates that opportunistic insiders are more profitable than routine insiders during the trade war. We also find that opportunistic females (insiders) and CEOs generate higher holding period returns from insider trading than opportunistic males (insiders) and directors. We also find that highly (lowly) compensated insiders and insiders of the technology (financial) sector generate higher holding period returns from insider buys (sells) than lowly (highly) compensated insiders and insiders of other sectors. All results suggest that opportunistic insiders can have a significant information advantage regarding the declaration of the trade war and the impact of this war on the stock market and firm performance, and that information can facilitate them to behave opportunistically.